Month: October 2019

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Miss Virginia

By Miranda Bonifield

Virginia Walden Ford is a mom whose extraordinary sacrifice and determination changed not just her own child’s life, but the lives of thousands of American students. Her story is now the subject of the new movie Miss Virginia, starring Orange Is the New Black’s Uzo Aduba.

Virginia’s experience as a black student integrating Little Rock high schools in the 1960s gave her a strong personal understanding of how important education is to a child’s success. When, years later, her own son William began slipping through the cracks of a Washington, D.C. public school where his teacher didn’t even know his name, she fought for a better option. Virginia’s answer came in the form of a scholarship and a second job working nights. William went from skipping school to being a joyful, enthusiastic student known by friends and teachers. Virginia believed every child should have that chance.

Virginia Walden Ford’s persistent work on behalf of low-income students in Washington, D.C. led to the creation of the Opportunity Scholarship Program, which gives thousands of low-income kids the chance to attend a private school. Virginia says, “We knew that if we raised our voices, we could win for our children. We did. And now our kids are winning as a result.”

You can watch Miss Virginia on Amazon Video, Google Play, and in select theaters around the country.

Miranda Bonifield is a Research Associate at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization. She is also the Program Assistant for the Children’s Scholarship Fund-Oregon program, which helps lower-income Oregon children attend private and parochial elementary schools through partial-tuition scholarships.

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Voters Should Reject Ballot Measure 26-203

By Eric Fruits, Ph.D.

By now, Oregon voters have received their ballots for the November 5 election. One of the items is Measure 26-203: a $475 million bond measure by Metro, the regional government for the Portland area.

Metro wants the money so it can buy more land for its so-called parks and nature program, a program that has shifted from providing parks for people to more vague and speculative objectives.

In Metro’s own words, the initial promise in 1995 was to “provide areas for walking, picnicking and other outdoor recreation.” This year’s measure now gives only passing mention to parks. And, it makes no promises of new parks, only preservation and maintenance of existing parks. In terms of bang for the buck, that’s a lot of bucks but not much bang.

Despite Metro’s earlier promises to provide parks for people, the agency has opened only seven parks and natural areas to the public over the last quarter-century. In some cases, promised parks never arrived.

Metro has about $30 million still sitting in its parks and nature bond funds, and it has an operating levy that runs through 2023. Voters should reject Measure 26-203 and urge Metro to use the money it already has to turn some of the land it’s already acquired into the parks that people demand.

Eric Fruits, Ph.D. is Vice President of Research at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

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Enough Is Enough: Voters Should Reject Metro’s Bond Measure

By Eric Fruits, Ph.D.

By now Oregon voters have received their ballots for the November 5 election. One of the items in the Portland region is Measure 26-203: a $475 million bond measure by Metro, the regional government for the Portland area. Adding in interest and other costs, Measure 26-203 will raise the region’s property taxes by about $60 million a year. Voters should say no to this measure.

Metro wants the money so it can buy more land for its so-called parks and nature program, a program that has shifted from providing parks for people to more vague and wide-ranging objectives.

Metro’s initial promise in 1995 to “provide areas for walking, picnicking, and other outdoor recreation” has changed to 2019’s bond measure promise to “protect water quality, fish, wildlife habitat, natural areas.” The 1995 ballot title mentioned parks eight times. The measure before voters now gives four passing mentions to parks. And, it makes no promises of new parks, only preservation and maintenance of existing parks.

Hidden lands, missing parks

Technically speaking, many of the natural areas are open to the public. More realistically, Metro makes great efforts to discourage public access. For example, a Metro attorney indicated to Cascade Policy Institute staff that many of Metro’s lands are not listed on its website specifically to prevent or discourage public access.

Even supporters of Measure 26-203 complain that most of Metro’s properties are out-of-reach. In three different languages in this year’s Voters’ Pamphlet, they conclude Metro’s acquisitions “exist as places on a map but not places you can actually go.”

In fact, Metro itself reports that more than 80% of the acres purchased with earlier bond funds are outside the region’s urban growth boundary. Because the UGB defines where most of the region’s population lives, much of this publicly owned land is far away from the public. For example, Metro’s much anticipated Chehalem Ridge nature park is located down a narrow, winding, gravel road more than seven miles from the nearest TriMet stop.

Despite Metro’s earlier promises to provide parks for people, the agency has opened only seven parks and natural areas to the public over the last quarter century. In some cases, promised parks never arrived. In 2005, Metro promised “at least four future public access points” for canoeing, kayaking, fishing, and picnicking. Since then—14 years later—only the Farmington Paddle Launch has been opened.

Over the years, Metro has spent more than $7 million to acquire 680 acres in the Clear Creek area, 20 minutes east of Oregon City. In 2007, Metro concluded the holdings have “such potential as a park.” Despite Clear Creek’s potential as a park, this year Metro indicated it did not have “any public access plans developed for Clear Creek Natural Area.” The site is now virtually off-limits to the public and does not appear on Metro’s parks and nature maps.

Vague promises, little accountability

Protection, preservation, and restoration of natural areas, watersheds, rivers, and streams for wildlife and fish are key components of Measure 26-203. These were also key components of the 1995 and 2006 bond measures.

Even so, Metro has provided scant information documenting its protection, preservation, and restoration efforts. While tree planting, weed removal, and volunteer efforts are mentioned in some Metro publications since 1995, the voter-approved operating levies were earmarked for restoration efforts. Metro reports that by 2018, only about 14% of the land it has acquired has been restored.

Enough is enough, vote no on Measure 26-203

Metro’s parks and nature bonds have been in place for nearly a quarter century. Over that time the agency has spent about half a billion dollars and acquired more than 14,000 acres of land. Metro has clear challenges managing the land it already holds. Promised parks have not been built, and some have been wiped off the map. Restoration efforts have not kept pace with property acquisitions.

Metro has about $30 million still sitting in its parks and nature bond funds, and it has an operating levy that runs through 2023. Voters should reject Measure 26-203 and urge Metro to use the money it already has to turn some of the land it’s already acquired into the parks that people demand.

Eric Fruits, Ph.D. is Vice President of Research at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization. A version of this article appeared in The Portland Tribune on October 22, 2019.

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Metro’s Housing Philosophy is Political, Not Practical

By Miranda Bonifield

Metro’s attempts to provide low-income public housing since last year’s $653 million bond measure passed have been stymied by the same problem encountered by cities from Portland to Stockholm: Metro’s preferred way of building housing is too expensive to be sustainable.

But instead of addressing the overwhelming costs of its projects, Metro is doubling down on ineffective practices which neither accomplish its goals nor increase the supply of so-called affordable housing.

For instance, Metro’s interest in “leading with racial equity” means they prioritize firms certified to be owned by minorities, women, or “emerging small businesses.” Members of Metro’s housing bond oversight committee recounted multiple stories in early meetings of contractors who circumvent the certification’s requirements by outsourcing their government work to other, non-certified contractors—rendering the certification nearly meaningless.

A local contractor pointed out that small businesses with limited capital avoid government contracts because the government doesn’t pay on time and requires mountains of time-consuming paperwork. Cutting red tape out of the process could improve the chances of small businesses bidding for contracts. But instead of emphasizing these practical considerations, the committee recommended local governments increase the number of meaninglessly certified contractors they hire. That’s not helping our community– it’s just virtue signaling.

Miranda Bonifield is a Research Associate at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market policy research organization.

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Press Release: Cascade Policy Institute Publishes Comprehensive Study of Metro’s Parks and Nature Program

October 15, 2019

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Media Contacts:
John A. Charles, Jr.
Eric Fruits, Ph.D.

PORTLAND, OR – In the next week or so, Portland area voters will receive their November ballots. One of the items is Measure 26-203: a $475 million bond measure by Metro, the regional government for the Portland area. Metro wants the money so it can buy more land for its so-called parks and nature program. Measure 26-203 will raise the region’s property taxes by about $60 million a year. The $475 million request is larger than the two previous Metro natural areas bonds combined, which were $135.6 million dollars in 1995 and $227.4 million dollars in 2006.

Cascade Policy Institute has published a comprehensive study of Metro’s parks and nature program, with the following conclusions:

  • Metro’s natural areas program began as a vision to increase and preserve parks and natural areas to a region facing increased population growth and density.
  • As the program evolved, the mission moved from providing parks for people to locking land away from the community that paid for it. The initial promise in 1995 to “provide areas for walking, picnicking, and other outdoor recreation” has shifted to the 2019 bond measure promise to “protect water quality, fish, wildlife habitat, natural areas.”
  • Over the nearly two decades since the first parks and nature bond measure, Metro has made, broken, and delayed its promises to voters.
    • In 2002, Metro imposed a solid waste tax enacted to pay for the operating costs of new parks. In 2006, Metro diverted the parks money into Metro’s general fund. In subsequent years, Metro put two operating levies on the ballot, increasing property taxes.
    • Chehalem Ridge was pitched as a regional park for Metro’s west side, but current plans are for a few miles of walking trails and a small picnic area. The park is more than seven miles from the nearest TriMet stop.
  • After spending hundreds of millions of dollars and acquiring more than 14,000 acres of land, less than 12 percent of Metro’s acquisitions are accessible to the public.
  • More than 80 percent of the acquisitions are outside the UGB.
  • Much of the land acquired by Metro was never at risk of development because Metro manages the region’s Urban Growth Boundary.
  • Metro’s restoration objectives, efforts, and results have been opaque and uncertain. Metro has provided no measurable documentation of changes to water quality or fish and wildlife populations.

Information was obtained from publicly available resources, interviews, and on-site visits to every natural area and nature park identified by Metro. Cascade paid thousands of dollars in public records requests to Metro.

Cascade’s report is available for download.

For more information on Measure 26-203 and Metro’s parks program, contact Cascade Policy Institute at 503-242-0900.

# # #

Contact Eric Fruits or John Charles at 503-242-0900 or by email at eric@cascadepolicy.org or john@cascadepolicy.org for more information or to schedule an interview.

About Cascade Policy Institute:

Founded in 1991, Cascade Policy Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy research and educational organization that focuses on state and local issues in Oregon. Cascade’s mission is to develop and promote public policy alternatives that foster individual liberty, personal responsibility, and economic opportunity. For more information, visit cascadepolicy.org.

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Like Other MAX Projects, TriMet’s Green Line Underdelivers at 10th Anniversary

By Rachel Dawson

TriMet has proven time and again that it is unable to live up to past promises. The MAX Green Line, which first opened 10 years ago, is no exception.

The Green Line is fifteen miles long and runs along I-205 from Portland State University to the Clackamas Town Center (CTC). It began as a portion of the North-South light rail alignment, which was canceled in 1988 after failing to secure voter funding. TriMet attempted to scale the alignment down to run from North Portland to the CTC, but the project was again rejected by voters in 1996 and 1998.

The plan for light rail to the CTC was later resurrected in 2001, and planning for the Green Line commenced in concert with the more recently implemented Orange Line to Milwaukie.

The alignment eventually earned federal approval in 2006. Of the total $575.7 million price tag, $478.2 million came from the federal government, $23 million came from the state, and $74.5 million came from local jurisdictions.

Of the local match, $69 million came from the City of Portland, $39.3 million from Clackamas County (the majority of which came from the county’s urban renewal funds), $23 million from the Oregon Department of Transportation, $20.5 million from TriMet, and $6.2 million from land donation and other funds.

The Green Line has failed to live up to these promised expectations:

Ridership is lower than projected. When the Federal Transit Administration completed its 2015 “Before and After Study” on the line, there was an average 24,000 daily weekday boarding rides. This is well below the 30,400 riders that TriMet predicted at entry into preliminary engineering for the line’s opening year. That number has continued to decrease to just over 16,000 average daily riders in August 2019, making up only 34% of the FEIS’s predicted ridership levels for 2025. With five years to go until 2025, it seems unlikely that the Green Line will garner the 30,500 riders needed to hit TriMet’s promised level of 46,500 boarding rides.

The line has lower frequency than promised. Trains arrive at stations every 15 minutes during peak periods and every 35 minutes at other times of the day. TriMet promised trains would arrive every 10 minutes during peak hours and every 15 during other times. TriMet attempted to blame this low level of service on a decline in tax revenues during the recession, but train frequency has not increased since the economy has recovered. Furthermore, TriMet’s total operating and non-operating revenues increased from 2009 to 2018 by 54%, and revenue from payroll and other taxes increased by 71%. The payroll tax rate will continue to go up every year until 2024, although it appears the Green Line’s level of service won’t increase with it.

Instead of the promised passengers, light rail brought increased crime to the CTC area. Clackamas County experienced heightened crime in the corridor from 2009-2012 after the Green Line opened and an increase in graffiti around MAX stops, according to a survey by the Oregon High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program sent to the Clackamas County Sheriff.

Unsurprisingly, the line’s cost was higher than TriMet originally anticipated. The final price tag of $576 million was 14% greater than the anticipated cost in preliminary engineering, a difference of about $70 million.

TriMet is now planning for a 12-mile line from downtown Portland to Tigard. Elected officials from Tualatin, Tigard, Durham, and Washington County should take a sobering look at TriMet’s track record on the Green Line, the Yellow Line, and WES. It shows a consistent pattern of over-promising and under-performing. Given this history, TriMet’s projections for the SW Corridor project should not be trusted.

Rachel Dawson is a Policy Analyst at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

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Hidden Lands, Unknown Plans: A Quarter Century of Metro’s Natural Areas Program

By Vladislav Yurlov, Helen Cook, and Micah Perry with Eric Fruits, Ph.D., research advisor

  1. Executive summary 

In June 2019, Metro’s Council referred to voters a $475 million bond measure for the acquisition and restoration of natural areas as well as future recreational opportunities. If passed, the measure will cost the region’s taxpayers approximately $60 million a year in property taxes. The $475 million request is larger than the two previous Metro natural areas bonds combined, which were $135.6 million dollars in 1995 and $227.4 million dollars in 2006. 

Cascade Policy Institute researched Metro’s management of its natural areas program. Information was obtained from publicly available resources, public records requests, interviews, and on-site visits to every natural area and nature park identified by Metro. Several areas were more thoroughly examined as case studies because of their location, size, acquisition price, and length of time owned by Metro. These case study areas comprise about 20 percent of the land acquired by Metro in the 1995 and 2006 bond measures. 

Cascade’s findings lead to the following conclusions: 

  • Metro’s natural areas program began as a vision to increase and preserve parks and natural areas to a region facing increased population growth and density. With increasing population density, local governments would offset the loss of backyards with more parks to meet, play, and offer “nature in neighborhoods.” It was an expensive vision that would require hundreds of millions of dollars. 
  • As the program evolved, the mission moved from providing parks for people to locking land away from the community that paid for it. The initial promise in 1995 to “provide areas for walking, picnicking, and other outdoor recreation” has shifted to the 2019 bond measure promise to “protect water quality, fish, wildlife habitat, natural areas.” Parks are to be “maintained” rather than built, expanded, or improved. 
  • Over the nearly two decades since the first parks and nature bond measure, Metro has made, broken, and delayed its promises to voters.  
  • Metro promised that a solid waste tax enacted to pay for the operating costs of new parks would protect residents from additional taxes for the same purpose. Nevertheless, it swept that money into Metro’s general fund and put two operating levies—increasing property taxes—on the ballot.  
  • Metro assured the region that Clear Creek would become a regional park. More than a decade later, it has no plans to make the area publicly accessible and has removed it from its maps of parks and natural areas. 
  • Chehalem Ridge was pitched as a regional park for Metro’s west side, but current plans are for a few miles of walking trails and a small picnic area.  
  • After spending hundreds of millions of dollars and acquiring more than 14,000 acres of land, less than 12 percent of the acquisitions are accessible to the public.  
  • Even the land that is open to the public is out of reach of many Portland residents.  
  • Seventy percent of Metro’s acquisitions have been outside Metro’s jurisdiction.  
  • More than 80 percent of the acquisitions are outside the Urban Growth Boundary 
  • A statement in the 2019 Voters’ Pamphlet from a group of bond supporters admits that many of Metro’s acquisitions “exist as places on a map but not places you can actually go.”  
  • Much of the land acquired by Metro was never at risk of development because Metro manages the region’s UGB 
  • Metro’s restoration objectives, efforts, and results have been opaque and uncertain. Metro has provided no measurable documentation of changes to water quality or fish and wildlife populations.  
  • Metro has promised a strategy focused on racial equity. Even so, minority communities’ desire for parks that serve as “gathering places, places to eat, security, and places for kids to play, exercise and cool off during the summer” have been overlooked in favor of natural areas amenable only to “passive recreation.” 

Metro has acquired more land than it can manage. The focus for the next decade should be on making current lands available for public use. Metro’s largest planned park—Chehalem Ridge near Gaston—has been in Metro ownership for nine years, and there is still no public access. Metro also owns about 1,400 acres in the Sandy River Gorge. These holdings are not shown on any of Metro’s parks and nature maps and Metro has no plans at all to make these properties available for swimming, boating, hiking, or family cookouts. Metro needs to turn these and other areas into parks its residents actually use before seeking more money to acquire more land.

Vladislav Yurlov, Helen Cook, and Micah Perry are Research Associates at Cascade Policy Institute. Eric Fruits, Ph.D., is Vice President of Research at Cascade.

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TriMet Broke Key Promises About MAX

Published in Portland Tribune

By Rachel Dawson

TriMet’s payroll tax has been increasing since 2005 and will continue to go up every year until 2024. There is no issue with revenue; rather, the issue lies with light rail.

TriMet’s MAX Yellow Line first opened 15 years ago in May 2004. The Yellow Line’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) made a myriad of predictions for the year 2020, which makes now the perfect time to reflect on what officials promised and what taxpayers and transit riders since have received.

The Yellow Line originated in 1988 as a 21-mile project connecting Vancouver, Washington, with downtown Portland and Clackamas Town Center. This plan was scrapped after Clark County voters defeated a proposal to raise $236.5 million in 1995 and Oregon voters turned down a $475 million regional ballot measure in 1998.

Read the full article here

Content credit to Portland Tribune

 

 

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Oregon Distilleries Deserve Better

By Helen Cook

Oregon has a booming craft distilling industry. That’s why it’s so surprising that one popular distiller is calling it quits. Mike Selberg, owner of Cannon Beach Distillery, announced in June that he was forced to close up shop. This is largely because of Oregon’s tax structure on distilleries.

I decided to reach out to other Oregon distilleries for their situations. The resounding message was that something needs to change. Local distillers are taxed on the dollar value of their tasting room sales rather than on alcohol content. This ultimately punishes small-volume, high-price distillers and discourages small distillers from thriving as local businesses.

Oregon is a “Liquor Control State.” This means that the Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) is the sole distributor of spirits. Distillers can sell spirits in Oregon liquor stores through the OLCC’s distribution network as well as out of their own tasting rooms, but the distillers’ products are owned by the state of Oregon.

Similarly to licensed liquor stores, tasting room owners are commissioned by the state to sell their spirits. This means that a certain percentage of each liquor sale from a tasting room goes to the OLCC every week. This percentage can be detrimental to distilleries.

While several distilleries, such as Stone Barn Brandyworks, value the distribution network that the OLCC offers, the majority acknowledge that this overall structure does not benefit tasting rooms. Sebastian Deegan at Stone Barn Brandyworks stated that 38-40% of his distillery’s gross income goes to the state because of the “tax” on his tasting room. “I don’t think there is a business in the country that can operate with that overhead.” On average, Oregon distillers currently pay 33% of gross retail sales.

Tom Burkleaux runs New Deal Distillery and serves as Vice-President for Oregon’s Distillery Guild. “The state of Oregon takes more than we take,” he said. “Everyone is frustrated. The cards are definitely stacked against a small distillery.”

Larger distilleries have an advantage because they generally produce cheaper spirits in higher volume. Since money is collected based on the retail price, distilleries that produce high volumes of lower priced spirits are not adversely affected by the system. However, smaller distilleries hoping to produce high-end goods are discouraged from this craft since manufacturing and the retail price cost significantly more.

Some distillers might take a similar approach to Mike Selberg’s at Cannon Beach Distillery: move to a distiller-friendly state. But Tom doesn’t think many will follow in Mike’s footsteps. “Most people would close up shop rather than move. You want to start your business in your home.”

Michelle Ly from Vinn Distillers noted this, stating: “I would say that we do really pride ourselves on wanting to be here. Oregon is known for supporting local business and being a tight-knit community, so I think if we were given that flexibility, we would all be doing much better and contributing to the economy of Oregon.” Vinn Distillery will have to close its tasting room this summer largely because of this tax burden.

Distillers hoped that legislation could be passed to remove distillery tasting rooms from this structure. But such legislation has already been suggested without much success or interest from legislators. Tad Seestedt from Ransom Spirits noted that “there are few legislators that really would like to see parity and want to help the Oregon’s distilling community.” Other distillers shared the same sentiment.

Ultimately, tasting room sales would barely make a dent if removed from OLCC’s $1.22 billion yearly revenue. Distilleries remitted $2,775,462 to the state as net profit from their sales in 2018. While this is pocket change for the OLCC, this remittance is significant for small distilleries.

Oregonians shouldn’t have to choose between their home, their business, and the quality of their product, especially when their craft is a point of pride for Oregon residents. Our local distilleries deserve better from our legislature and the state of Oregon.

Helen Cook is a Research Associate at the Portland-based Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization. She can be reached at info@cascadepolicy.org.

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Shrinking Roads and Rising Fatalities Don’t Bode Well for Portland’s Vision Zero

By Rachel Dawson

Portland hasn’t seen 50 road fatalities since 1996. With 43 fatalities already, it looks like 2019 will be a record-breaking year, with no thanks to Portland’s Vision Zero Action Plan.

Placing concrete pedestrian islands in the middle of the road, giving little to no room to turn onto side streets, installing plastic pylons against the roadway, and using confusing signage and lines—all Vision Zero road changes implemented to decrease road fatalities—don’t seem to be making streets safer.

While many factors are involved, perhaps distracted and dangerous walking, driving, and biking habits play a greater role in traffic accidents than the number of car lanes or crosswalks on a given street.

As a pedestrian, I’ve walked across a street with my eyes glued to my phone. Luckily, I haven’t been hit by a car. But if I had, it would’ve been due to my inability to separate my attention from my mobile device. The same goes for distracted drivers. I’ve watched drivers on the Sellwood Bridge pull out their phones when traffic slowed. Our failure to pay attention to the road and take safety precautions, especially at night, is putting ourselves and others at risk.

Portland’s approach of downsizing roads is punitive and counterproductive. Instead, everyone on the road system should take responsibility for their own behavior, regardless of what mode of travel is being used.

Rachel Dawson is a Policy Analyst at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

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Where Is Our Metro Park at Chehalem Ridge?

By Helen Cook

This summer, I was walking on an old logging road in the middle of thick forest, not a person in sight. The only sign of human activity were signs nailed to the trees prohibiting fungus-collecting. A tattered strand of red tape displaying the print, “Invasive Species,” waved in the wind.

You wouldn’t know it since no signage exists, but I was hiking through Metro’s biggest natural area: Chehalem Ridge. In fact, you wouldn’t know this was public property. The trailhead is on the side of a gravel road after driving miles through rural countryside. A gated fence blocks the entrance alongside a sign forbidding a long list of activities, including dog-walking. (Ironically, later in the day, I observed a couple walking their dog in Chehalem. There was no one there to stop them.)

Metro bought Chehalem Ridge Natural Area in 2010. The land is nestled between Forest Grove and Gaston, about a 20-minute drive to Hillsboro. The size of the parcel is actually bigger than Central Park in New York. In other words, this land’s potential is not that of a typical neighborhood park.

But where is our park? Metro likened the area to the future “Oxbow Regional Park,” whose popularity is due in part to its camping sites, twelve miles of trails, and picnic areas.

The regional government is in no hurry to fulfill this promise. The land has purportedly undergone restoration for nine years. Yet when I asked Metro for evidence, few numbers were given. The only indication of restoration on the website are whimsical “field notes” by a Metro Senior Scientist. Some mentions of thinning forest and planting shrubs are sporadically found in updates. But I was unable to find proof of water quality restoration, which is one of the most important reason cited for acquiring the land.

So if Chehalem Ridge is really Metro’s next big success story, why hasn’t it become a reality? It’s unclear why we don’t see a park since Metro had several opportunities to develop the area.

Voters approved a $226 million dollar bond for parks and nature in 2006. This was supplemented by a $50 million dollar levy for maintenance in 2013 and another levy in 2016. But Metro is asking for $475 million dollars more in a 2019 bond, some of which is promised to Chehalem Ridge. All of this money comes from taxpayers, but Metro seems in no rush to return the favor.

Even when Metro eventually breaks ground on Chehalem, none of this money will go to the biggest obstacle: the roads. The winding roads leading to the park are extremely difficult to drive with traffic. But Metro has no jurisdiction to repave the roads. Washington County, which does have this authority, certainly has no intention of improving roads in the area. Just to be sure, I asked them. A definitive no was the immediate answer, despite the fact that Metro will be charged an estimated $2 million Transportation Impact Fee by Washington County when construction permits are issued.

During the next several years, you will not see campsites, twelve miles of trails, playgrounds, or access for low-income individuals who can’t drive to the park. What Chehalem’s master plan does promise you is three miles of multi-use trails, a trailhead, parking, and restrooms. To put it bluntly, you are promised a remote trail that’s less useable than your average neighborhood park.

I suggest taxpayers contact Metro to ask that it live up to the promise of an “Oxbow Regional Park.” If Metro wants voters to maintain a higher tax rate with this proposed bond, voters should demand that original promises be kept.

Maybe with more accountability, Metro would live up to its slogan, “Promises Made, Promises Kept.” But as of now, I’m skeptical. That’s why I plan to vote “No” this November on Metro’s newest $475 million bond. Metro needs more transparency, not more money.

Helen Cook is a Research Associate at the Portland-based Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization. She can be reached at info@cascadepolicy.org. A version of this article appeared in the Portland Tribune on October 4, 2019.

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Dumbing Down Voters

By John A. Charles, Jr.

In 2016 Val Hoyle, then a legislator from Eugene, introduced a bill to guarantee postage-paid envelopes for Oregon’s vote-by-mail system. She argued that having to find and apply a stamp was a barrier to voter participation, especially to young people.

That idea was widely ridiculed, and the bill died.

Unfortunately, the political culture has changed. In March the Oregon legislature quietly passed SB 861, which requires the state to pay for ballot envelopes that can be returned by business reply mail. It will go into effect on or after January 1, 2020.

Implementation will cost an estimated $1.6 million to the state General Fund for the first 18 months. There will be an additional cost to Counties of $84,000 to destroy obsolete ballot return envelopes.

Is Oregon really so wealthy that we should spend $1.6 million just to ensure that voters don’t have to find a first class stamp? I don’t think so. Instead of treating postage as a voting barrier, perhaps we should treat it as an entrance exam.

The test would be simple: If you can’t figure out how to use stamps, or you are incapable of hand-delivering your ballot to the county elections office, you are not qualified to vote.

We might get better results.

John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

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