Time for a Third Bridge to Vancouver

Last week a conceptual plan for a new bridge over the Columbia River was unveiled at a public forum in Vancouver, WA. The plan, presented by Florida-based Figg Engineering, calls for a four-lane bridge east of I-205. The new bridge would have 144 feet of river clearance – the same as the I-205 Bridge — and include sidewalks and bikeways completely protected from highway traffic.

The financing is still to be determined, but could involve user fees, known as tolls. In fact, one option would be for the bridge to be privately owned and operated, paid entirely with tolls. Those drivers unwilling to pay could continue to use the Glenn Jackson Bridge, as they do today.

Oregon political officials are notably cold towards the idea of a third or fourth bridge over the Columbia. Local politicians believe that the two bridges we have now are all we should ever get – even though Portland is served by nearly a dozen bridges over the smaller Willamette River.

As the Portland-Vancouver region grows we will need much more bridge capacity. Since government won’t provide it, we should welcome this opportunity to pursue a private investment option.

John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

Moving Forward from the Columbia River Crossing

By Kevin Sharp

With the recent suspension of the Columbia River Crossing project, people are already asking, “What should replace it?” The answer, at least for right now, is, “Nothing.” While it is frustrating that the government spent $170 million to not build a bridge, the cost of a poorly conceived bridge would be much greater.

Before Portland and Vancouver do anything else, they need to look seriously into the root of the transportation problems facing each city and plan accordingly. They also need to understand that just replacing the I-5 Bridge with a different bridge is not a lasting solution to the traffic problems. A new bridge needs to be a supplement to the existing Columbia River bridges.

To make the project viable, Portland also needs to abandon its inherently political goal of spreading light rail anywhere and everywhere. A simple bridge to ease traffic congestion is all that is necessary; but Portland transportation planners continually insist on expanding the MAX line to Washington―while Washington residents obviously do not want that. Any attempt to send light rail to Vancouver will only waste more time, taxpayer dollars, and resources that could go to more productive and valuable projects. A bridge should connect the cities; it doesn’t need to drive them apart.

Kevin Sharp is a research associate at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free-market think tank.

Statement on the Columbia River Crossing Project

For Immediate Release

Media Contact
John A. Charles, Jr., john@cascadepolicy.org
503-459-3727
Sarah Ross Wolf, sarah@cascadepolicy.org
503-242-0900

Statement on the
Columbia River Crossing Project

PORTLAND, Ore. – In light of the decision by the governors of Washington and Oregon to shut down planning for the Columbia River Crossing (CRC) project, John A. Charles, Jr., President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, issued the following statement:

“The CRC was never a solution to any transportation problem, and the Washington State Legislature did the right thing by refusing to appropriate more money for it.

“As the two Northwest governors move forward, they should consider the following points:

  • The Interstate Bridge is not in any danger of imminent collapse and should be used for decades to come.
  • Expansion of rail transit between Vancouver and Portland should be taken off the table. Existing express bus service operated by C-TRAN is already providing excellent transit between the two cities.
  • Any new bridge should have a minimum river clearance of 144 feet, which matches the Glenn Jackson Bridge.
  • The governors should consider building at least two new Columbia River bridges in the region, one to the west of I-5 and one to the east of I-205. The reasons are to create redundancy in the case of an earthquake, and to provide better connectivity between the states. By dispersing traffic across four bridges, most congestion problems will disappear, making all classes of bridge users better off and reducing emissions caused by congestion.

“We have ten bridges across the Willamette River in Portland, and each serves an important purpose. There is no policy reason why we should restrict the number of Columbia River crossings to just two.”

###

Open Letter to Federal Transit Administration Regarding TriMet

 On June 14th, John Charles sent this letter to the Federal Transit Administration regarding TriMet and C-TRAN proposals for the CRC light rail project.

June 14, 2013

 

Richard F. Krochalis

Regional Administrator, FTA

Jackson Federal Building
915 Second Avenue, Suite 3142
Seattle, WA 98174

            Re: FTA requirements for operating funds on New Starts projects

Dear Mr. Krochalis,

I was in the audience on May 15th when you discussed the CRC light rail proposal with the C-TRAN board. I heard you say repeatedly that the application for a FFGA could not proceed until C-TRAN had a firm commitment of adequate funding to operate the new train line.

However, those statements are at variance with how FTA is handling the same issue for federally funded LRT projects in Portland. As I outlined to you in a detailed letter two years ago, TriMet has been in violation of its FFGA for the Green Line since the day it opened, and FTA has done nothing about it.

Service hours for the Green Line were reduced by 33% before it ever opened in September 2009.[1] Service has continued to decline since then. Weekly revenue hours have dropped from 692.4 in the opening year to 686.3 in the fall of 2012, a loss of 1%.[2]

TriMet is also in violation of its FFGA for the Yellow MAX line. That line opened in 2004 with 605.4 weekly revenue service hours. By the fall of 2012, service had dropped to 568.4 weekly revenue hours, a loss of 6%.[3]

Peak-hour service on the Yellow Line was supposed to operate at headways of 10 minutes in the opening year, improving to 7.5 minutes by 2020[4]. Instead, peak-hour headways are currently 15 minutes.[5]

As I pointed out to you in 2011, TriMet has a dedicated revenue source that was supposed to be used to fulfill the obligations of the respective FFGAs. That source, the regional payroll tax, was enhanced by the state legislature in both 2003 and 2009, allowing TriMet to raise the tax rate. The first tax increase was implemented effective January 2005, and has raised a cumulative total of $122.6 million in new revenue through FY 13.[6]

The combined net operating costs of the Green and Yellow lines in 2011 were $10.2 million.[7] Clearly the new revenues generated by the payroll tax rate increase were adequate to pay for all promised new service on the two new MAX lines, if such service had been a priority for TriMet – which it isn’t.

Not only has TriMet failed to provide promised service on federally-funded light rail lines, the agency’s  total fixed route service has dropped by 14% since 2005 — despite the fact that the agency’s all-funds budget has gone up by 125% over that same period, as displayed below:

TriMet Financial Resources, 2004-2013 (000s) 

 

FY 04/05

FY 08/09

FY 10/11

FY 11/12 (est)

FY 12/13 (budget)

% Change 04/05-12/13

Passenger fares

$  59,487

$  90,016

$  96,889

$  104,032

$117,166

+97%

Payroll tax revenue

$171,227

$209,089

$224,858

$232,832

244,457

+43%

Total operating resources

$308,766

397,240

$399,641

$476,364

$465,056

+51%

Total Resources

$493,722

$888,346

$920,044

$971,613

$1,111,384

+125%

 

Annual Fixed Route Service Trends, 2004-2012 

FY 04

FY 06

FY 08

FY 10

FY 12

Change

Veh. revenue hours

1,698,492

1,653,180

1,712,724

1,682,180

1,561,242

-8.1%

Veh. revenue miles

27,548,927

26,830,124

26,448,873

25,781,480

23,625,960

-14.2

In its most recent long-term financial forecast, TriMet admits that the agency’s current service problems are “not caused by TriMet’s revenue base.” According to the agency, TriMet’s operating revenues per capita “are 70% higher than its peer comparators.”[8]

Nonetheless, TriMet service is in a death spiral.

TriMet General Manager told his board in February that the forecast for TriMet service shows that by 2030, the agency will have a “revenue-expenditure imbalance” of some $200 million. Therefore, TriMet clearly does not expect to meet its light rail service obligations to FTA at any time during the life of the two relevant FFGAs.

In your response to me on June 20, 2011, you noted that many transit agencies experience temporary service declines due to various economic factors. Such conditions were “not typically viewed by FTA as a breach of contract.”  You pointed out that Section 19(a) of the FTA FFGA discusses “default” in terms of “…substantial failure of the Grantee to complete the Project in accordance with the Application” for federal funding.

It is clear that TriMet has failed and will continue to fail to meet its contractual obligations to operate federally-financed light rail lines as promised.

Given these facts, I can only conclude that either you misinformed the C-TRAN board about the importance of local operating revenues, or you will soon be requiring TriMet to begin fulfilling its FFGAs for the Green and Yellow lines. Which of these things is true?

Please advise at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

 

John A. Charles, Jr.

President & CEO

 

CC:       C-TRAN Board of Directors

TriMet Board of Directors

Interested parties



[1] TriMet, Fall 2010 Financial Forecast, p. 39.

[2] TriMet finance office, personal communication with the author, September 18, 2012.

[3] Ibid

[4] TriMet, Before and After Study, Yellow MAX Line, 2009, p. 2-2.

[5] TriMet website as of June 14, 2013, http://www.trimet.org/schedules/w/t1190_1.htm.

 

[6] TriMet, CRC August 2011 New Starts Submittal, Table 1.

[7] TriMet, FY11 Operating Statistics

[8] TriMet, Long Term Fiscal Sustainability Plan, December 2012, p. 7.

Where’s the Secret Tax for the I-5 Bridge Proposal?

On Monday, the Oregon Senate passed House Bill 2800, the new Interstate 5 Bridge Replacement Proposal (otherwise known as the Columbia River Crossing), which now goes to Governor Kitzhaber for his signature. Despite its passage, the I-5 bridge plan is still seriously flawed.

Legislators have authorized $450 million in debt financing without telling Oregonians who will be taxed for the debt service. All they have said to date is that ODOT will have to pay between $27 and 35 million annually for interest payments on bonds. Since ODOT doesn’t have the money, there must be a future tax increase – just not voted on by the same people who voted for HB 2800 this session.

This “back-loaded” approach to paying for projects taxpayers can’t afford is cynical and dishonest. The I-5 Bridge Proposal passed because legislators didn’t have to admit they were raising taxes. If the plan had included a 4-cent-per-gallon tax increase or a doubling of the vehicle registration fee, the debate would have been completely different.

Legislators who voted for HB 2800 wanted the glory of passing a bill; but before they start pouring concrete, they should look us in the eye and tell us which tax they plan to raise. If they can’t give us an honest answer, they aren’t qualified to serve.

Kathryn Hickok is Publications Director at Cascade Policy Institute.

Cascade in the Capitol: Light Rail to Vancouver vs. CTRAN Express Buses – Testimony on HB 2800

Cascade President John Charles testified today before the Joint Committee on Interstate-5 Bridge Replacement Project regarding HB 2800. His testimony follows.

The CRC Plan for Light Rail:

A Step Backwards for Transit Customers

 John A. Charles, Jr.

Cascade Policy Institute

February 2013

Metric

TriMet Yellow MAX Line to North Portland

CTRAN Express Buses Serving Downtown Portland

Capital cost of expanding  light rail to Vancouver

$932 million

$0

2011 annual operating cost

$10.2 million

$5.04 million

Operating cost/hour

$270

$110

Annual hours of service

40,492

45,996

Farebox recovery ratio for operations cost

47%

67%

Cost/new vehicle

$4,200,000

$458,333

Peak-hour frequency

Every 15 minutes

Every 10.3-15.5 minutes

Peak-hour travel speed

15 MPH

31-45 MPH

Travel time, Vancouver to Portland

36-38 minutes

16 -18 minutes

% of passenger seating capacity actually used at the peak period

34%

38%

Promises of Frequent Transit Services: Hope Over Experience

According to the most recent finance plan for this project, “Light rail in the new guideway and in the existing Yellow line alignment would be planned to operate with 7.5 minute headways during the “peak of the peak” and with 15-minute headways at all other times. This compares to 12-minute headways in “peak of the peak” and 15-minute headways at all other times for the existing Yellow line.”[1]

In fact, the Yellow Line runs at 15 minute headways all day, with even less service at night.  Yet according to the FTA Full Funding Grant Agreement for the Yellow Line, service is supposed to be operating at 10-minute headways at the peak, improving to 7.5 minute headways by 2020. TriMet is violating its FFGA contract, which could lead to a denial of funding for the $850 million grant request that the CRC project plans to make.

The Green MAX line is also operating at service levels of at least 33% below those promised in the FFGA. 

The legislature should not be expanding TriMet’s territory at this time – especially into another state that already has a transit district – because TriMet cannot afford to operate the system it already has. Despite a steady influx of general fund dollars, TriMet has been cutting service ever since the legislature approved a payroll tax rate increase in 2003, as shown below.

TriMet Financial Resources, 2004-2013 (000s)

 

FY 04/05

FY 08/09

FY 10/11

FY 11/12 (est)

FY 12/13 (budget)

% Change 04/05-12/13

Passenger fares

$   59,487

$   90,016

$   96,889

$   104,032

$117,166

+97%

Payroll tax revenue

$171,227

$209,089

$224,858

$232,832

244,457

+43%

Total operating resources

$308,766

397,240

$399,641

$476,364

$465,056

+51%

Total Resources

$493,722

$888,346

$920,044

$971,613

$1,111,384

+125%

Note: Pursuant to legislation adopted in 2003, the TriMet payroll tax rate was increased on January 1, 2005, will rise by .0001% annually until it reaches a rate of .007218% on January 1, 2014.

 

  Annual Fixed Route Service Trends, 2004-2012

FY 04

FY 06

FY 08

FY 10

FY 12

% Change

Veh. revenue hours

1,698,492

1,653,180

1,712,724

1,682,180

1,561,242

-8.1%

Vehicle revenue miles

27,548,927

26,830,124

26,448,873

25,781,480

23,625,960

-14.2

Average veh. speed – bus

15.8

15.8

14.9

14.7

14.6

-7.6%

Average veh. speed – L. Rail

20.1

19.4

19.3

19.4

18.4

-11.5%

Source: TriMet annual service and ridership report; TriMet budget documents and audited financial statements, various years.



[1] C-TRAN, High Capacity Transit System and Finance Plan, July 20, 2012, p. 4.

Cascade in the Capitol: Testimony Before the Joint Committee on Legislative Oversight on Columbia River Crossing

Testimony of John A. Charles, Jr.

President, Cascade Policy Institute

Before the Joint Committee on Legislative Oversight on Columbia River Crossing

 Regarding the Proposed Light Rail Extension to Vancouver

March 15, 2012

The CRC is fundamentally a light rail project. Therefore the first task for the Oversight Committee should be to rigorously assess the purpose and need for light rail. Specifically, what transportation service will light rail provide, and how does that service compare with express bus service currently offered by CTRAN?

It is important that the comparisons be made on a side-by-side basis, not system-wide.  The reason is that the cost-effectiveness of TriMet’s light rail system varies considerably by line. The Yellow line is the least productive MAX line in the entire system[1], averaging only 127 boarding rides/vehicle-hour. In contrast, the most productive line (Blue) averages 166 rides/vehicle-hour.

A summary of key metrics clearly shows that light rail compares poorly:

 

CRC Light Rail vs. CTRAN Express Bus

 

MAX Yellow Line

CTRAN I-5 Express buses

Peak-hour travel time*

36 minutes

16 minutes

Total capital cost, 2012-2020**

$856-$944 million

$4-$8 million

% of operations cost covered by fares***

47%

67%

 

 

*Derived from the FEIS and CTRAN published schedules.

**Various CRC finance documents; author’s estimates for CTRAN.

***Personal communication with finance staff of the respective agencies, 3/14/12.

Travel Speed: The only reason to add new transit service is to make bi-state travelers better off. Light rail would make them worse off, by lengthening commute times by 125%. The attached paper by transit consultant Thomas Rubin provides a more detailed analysis. This is a fatal flaw that cannot be overcome, because MAX is an all-local system, and it is competing with Express Bus service.

Cost: At roughly $300 million/mile, this would be the most expensive transit project in Oregon history. For comparison, the Milwaukie LR project is estimated to cost $211 million/mile while the Emerald Express BRT project in Eugene-Springfield cost $6 million/mile.

Light rail proponents have long argued that the high capital costs of rail are offset by savings in operations cost, but that is based on systemwide averages.  Actual numbers for CTRAN I-5 Express Buses and the Yellow MAX line suggest that there will be no operating cost savings for light rail.  CTRAN recovers 67% of bus operating costs from passenger fares, while the Yellow MAX line collects only 47%.

Conclusion: Vancouver light rail would serve no public purpose and would have extremely low ridership. The Legislative Oversight Committee should euthanize it as soon as possible.



[1] TriMet FY 2012 Transit Investment Plan, P. 103

Ending Highway Gridlock in Portland

randall_pozdena

by Randall Pozdena, Ph.D.

Click here to read the full report in PDF format

The Portland region is rated the 24th most congested metropolitan area in the country, but it does not have to be. Policymakers in Portland have focused on so-called “smart-growth” policies, limiting the geographic extent of development and developing light rail and streetcar infrastructure, while overlooking lower-cost, efficient and environmentally beneficial transit and roadway capacity solutions. In this report, Dr. Randall Pozdena presents the fundamental problems with the way Portland addresses roadway capacity issues, explains why systemic reform is needed, and proposes real recommendations for getting there.

Testimony of John A. Charles, Jr.Regarding SB 580-6

.John A. Charles, Jr.Cascade Commentary

April 15, 2009
As a member of the Oregon Road User Fee Task Force, I support the policy direction of SB 580-6. The construction and ongoing maintenance of highways, tunnels and bridges should be financed through direct road user fees, collected via electronic tolling technology.

Listen to John’s testimony at 22:14-26:14 and 27:48-30:17 on the audio file.

Read more