Testimony Regarding Senate Bills 432, 602, 608, 612 and 618

Testimony of John A. Charles, Jr.

President & CEO, Cascade Policy Institute

Regarding Senate Bills 432, 602, 608, 612 and 618

April 6, 2017

Advocates of land-use planning strongly believe that the benefits of planning always outweigh the costs.

But no regulatory system is perfect. Certainly the Oregon program can be improved, if we have the will.

The most obvious problem is that land-use regulation imposes a static vision on a dynamic economy. Oregon demands “urban containment” as the top priority, enforced through urban growth boundaries and rural exclusionary zoning. This has to result in an imbalance between housing supply and demand, leading to rapid price escalation. There is no other logical outcome unless planning advocates have invented a new economic theory that only they understand.

The bills under discussion today may not be the perfect responses to current problems, but surely at least one of them could be used by the Committee as a vehicle for modest reform.

I encourage the Committee to pick one flaw in the Oregon system and address it going forward.

You could focus on the dysfunctional urban growth boundary management process, the punitive “Transportation Planning Rule,” or perhaps farmland preservation requirements that are disconnected from economic reality.

It doesn’t matter which problem you address, but to say that no flaws exist and all reform bills must be killed year after year is not plausible.

Failure to address obvious problems will undermine public confidence in the legislative process. Please use the remaining time in this session to solve at least one problem related to zoning.


John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

Selling Bonds to Buy the Elliott State Forest Would Be a Breach of Fiduciary Trust

By John A. Charles, Jr.

State Treasurer Tobias Read has announced that he is now prepared to support a plan being developed by Gov. Kate Brown to sell bonds that would “buy out” the Elliott State Forest from the Common School Trust Land portfolio and keep it in public ownership.

Unfortunately, this would saddle taxpayers with debt service on the bonds, thereby reducing or even eliminating the financial benefits of adding the bond proceeds to the corpus of the Common School Fund. This would be a breach of fiduciary trust on the part of the State Land Board.

Members of the public may not understand that bond sales don’t create “free” money; the face amount must be repaid over some designated period of time, with interest.

For example, if the legislature authorizes the sale of $100 million in general obligation bonds, total principal and interest will likely exceed $150 million over several decades.  All Oregon taxpayers will be legally obligated to pay off that debt.

Another option might be the sale of bonds backed by future earnings on the Oregon Lottery. But lottery revenues are essentially the same as General Fund revenues. Paying debt service on lottery-backed bonds will inevitably take money from public schools.

The Governor’s proposal to have the public buy a forest it already owns is akin to someone losing money in an IRA, then transferring funds into the account from a 401(k) to make up for the loss. If both accounts are owned by the same individual, there is no net gain; the loss is just disguised.

As the state’s elected Treasurer, Tobias Read should know better. The only way to decouple the Elliott State Forest from the Common School Fund is to sell it to private parties with no taxpayer financing involved.

Such an offer is sitting in front of the Board today. The Board should accept the offer of $220.8 million from the Lone Rock Timber consortium, place the net proceeds into the Common School Fund, and let the money begin immediately working for public school students.


John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of the Portland-based Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

 

It’s Finally Time to Sell the Elliott State Forest

By John A. Charles, Jr.

At the February 14 meeting of the State Land Board, the Board voted 2-1 to enter into negotiations with a private consortium to sell 82,450 acres of the Elliott State Forest. Gov. Kate Brown, who was on the losing end of the vote, has ordered the Department of State Lands to come back in April with an alternative plan that would allow for continued public ownership.

Not only is the Governor being petulant, but the alternative she favors has been studied repeatedly since 1995. That was the year that the Board released its first “Draft Asset Management Plan.” The Elliott was then valued at $850 million, but annual revenues were dropping due to rising management costs.

The Land Board was told by a consultant that “selling the Elliott State Forest would be the most effective way to maximize Common School Fund revenues.” The Board is required by the Oregon Constitution to make money on the Elliott because it is an endowment asset for public schools.

Sadly, that recommendation was rejected. Instead, state officials spent the next 20 years engaged in fruitless negotiations with federal regulators regarding compliance with the Endangered Species Act. Every time the Board thought an agreement to cut more timber had been reached, it turned out to be a false summit.

Meanwhile, advocacy groups used the Elliott as a legal piñata. They successfully sued the Land Board so many times that the forest stopped generating any revenue by 2013 and actually became a financial liability for Oregon schools.

The costs of this wait-and-see approach were not trivial. According to a report published by the Board in 2014, the Elliott had cost the Common School Fund $1.4 billion in lost earnings since 1995.

Things actually worsened after the report was published. In 2015 the Land Board decided to finally sell the Elliott; but instead of taking competitive bids, the Board established a fixed price. The Board also downzoned the land by imposing multiple limitations on future timber harvesting.

The result was that the Board received a single offer in 2016, for the state-mandated price of $220.8 million. The net result of 22 consecutive years of public ownership was a loss to the Common School Fund of at least $1.62 billion.

Governor Kate Brown now wants to renege on the sale entirely (despite voting for it in 2015) and use state bonding capacity to “buy out” a portion of the Elliott. This is probably the worst idea yet. The public already owns the forest; why would we want to go into debt buying ourselves out?

While the $220.8 million offer now on the table is a far cry from the $850 million we could have received in 1996, it’s better than hanging on to a dead asset. Secretary of State Dennis Richardson and State Treasurer Tobias Read voted to sell the forest, and that was the appropriate decision. Adding $220 million in new revenue to the Common School Fund endowment will generate many billions of dollars for schools over the next century.


John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization. A version of this article originally appeared in the Portland Tribune on March 16, 2017.

Land Board Votes to Sell Elliott State Forest

By John A. Charles, Jr. 

On February 14 the Oregon State Land Board – comprised of Governor Kate Brown, Treasurer Tobias Read, and Secretary of State Dennis Richardson – voted 2-1 to sell 82,450 acres of the Elliott State Forest to a consortium of private parties led by Lone Rock Timber Management Company. The agreed-upon sale price is $220.8 million; and the net proceeds will be placed in the Oregon Common School Fund (CSF), an endowment for public schools.

This parcel is a small part of the Oregon Common School Trust Land portfolio of 1.5 million acres of lands that must be managed by the Land Board to maximize revenue over the long term for the benefit of public schools.

For many years the Elliott was a money-maker, but environmental litigation steadily reduced timber harvesting to a trickle. For the last three years the Elliott has actually lost money, which prompted the Board in August 2015 to vote unanimously to sell the Elliott and put the proceeds into alternative investments.

As a long-time Board member, Gov. Kate Brown repeatedly voted to sell the forest, but in December 2016 she changed her mind and announced her intent to use state bonding capacity to buy a portion of the Elliott and keep it in public ownership. Treasurer Ted Wheeler and Secretary of State Jeanne Atkins agreed with her conceptually, but no formal vote was taken and both of them have since left the Board.

At the meeting earlier this week, Gov. Brown made a motion to terminate any further negotiations to sell the forest, despite the fact that Lone Rock and its partners had spent at least $500,000 putting together a good-faith offer in response to the Land Board’s sale protocol. Her motion never received a second.

New Treasurer Tobias Read indicated that he was uncomfortable walking away from the offer at the last minute, and that the legal doctrine of “undivided loyalty” to Common School Fund beneficiaries – public schools – compelled him to sell the money-losing forest. Secretary of State Dennis Richardson concurred and the Governor was out-voted.

Cascade Policy Institute has been urging the Land Board to sell the Elliott since 1996, when the forest was valued at roughly $800 million. It was evident to us that over the next several decades, environmental lawyers would treat the Elliott like a legal piñata and file continuous lawsuits to prevent timber harvesting. That is exactly what happened, turning this vibrant forest into a net liability by 2013.

Cascade published a number of technical papers demonstrating that over virtually any time period and under any reasonable set of assumptions, Oregon schools would be better off if the Board simply sold the forest and put the net proceeds into stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments. These papers were ignored by multiple generations of Land Board members, including John Kitzhaber, Ted Kulongoski, Jim Hill, Phil Keisling, Randall Edwards, and Kate Brown.

Many editorial writers are urging the Land Board to “hit the pause button” on this sale, but the fact is the Board has been “pausing” since at least 1995. As timber harvest receipts steadily declined over the next several decades, Oregon wasted more than $3 million trying to negotiate a so-called “Habitat Conservation Plan” with the federal government that would shield Oregon from further litigation. Such an agreement was never reached.

In a report paid for by the Department of State Lands in 2015, experts found that the failure to sell the Elliott in 1995 – as recommended by a Department of Forestry consultant – had cost public schools $1.4 billion in lost earnings over a 20-year period.

Gov. Brown’s last-minute effort to buy back timberland the public already owns was poorly thought out. Most of the media observers – who tend to favor public ownership – have apparently overlooked the fact that any revenue bonds sold by Oregon would have to be paid off by profits generated on-site. Since the Elliott has been steadily losing money under public management, it’s unlikely that anyone would even buy such bonds.

Although selling the Elliott was the right thing to do, we will never know if the public received fair market value because the Land Board refused to take competitive bids. In 2016 the Board established a price of $220.8 million based on multiple appraisals, and no one was allowed to offer a higher amount. Clearly, this was a bizarre way to sell a valuable asset and demonstrates how Kate Brown, Ted Wheeler, and Jeanne Atkins consistently abdicated their fiduciary responsibilities in favor of a political agenda to retain public ownership.

Treasurer Read and Secretary Richardson deserve credit for moving forward with the sale. Neither of them wanted to do it, but they understand that they have an obligation to current and future public school students to add value to the Common School Fund.


John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

Bad Consequences of Public Policies Aren’t Really “Unintended,” Just “Unacknowledged”

By Steve Buckstein

Decades of research and experience tell us that raising the government-imposed minimum wage results in fewer younger and lower-skilled individuals being hired, and in some of them losing jobs they previously held at lower wages.*

Decades of research and experience also tell us that requiring landlords to charge lower rent than market conditions dictate results in fewer housing units being built, making housing shortages worse and raising housing costs in areas not subject to rent controls.**

During last year’s minimum wage debate in Oregon, pointing out the negative consequences was not enough to stop the legislature from imposing significant wage increases. Likewise, this year the legislature may allow local jurisdictions to impose rent controls even though opponents will surely point out the negative consequences of this policy also.

It now seems obvious what is happening. Supporters of minimum wage increases and rent control aren’t blind to their negative consequences; they simply refuse to acknowledge them because the political benefits outweigh the real costs imposed on those forced to endure them.

The harm done by minimum wage increases and rent control is so obvious that we should probably stop saying that their negative consequences are “unintended.”  Rather, we should say that their negative consequences are “unacknowledged” because their supporters refuse to admit that they exist.

* Making Youth Unemployment Worse, Randall Pozdena and Steve Buckstein, Cascade Policy Institute, December 2016

** The Rent Is Too Damn High! — Why Rent Control Won’t Help, Steve Buckstein, Cascade Policy Institute, September 2016


Steve Buckstein is Founder and Senior Policy Analyst at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

Testimony Before the Oregon State Land Board on the Sale of State Trust Lands

Cascade Policy Institute President and CEO John A. Charles, Jr. presented a version of this testimony before the Oregon State Land Board on December 13, 2016.


Re: December 13 SLB hearing on the possible sale of the Elliott State Forest

Dear Land Board members:

I am writing in advance of the December 13 Land Board hearing to summarize my testimony.

First, you were correct in deciding last year that a sale of the trust lands was necessary to fulfill your fiduciary responsibilities to the Common School Fund (CSF) beneficiaries. The continued requests from public land advocates to retain ownership should be ignored.

Unfortunately, your sale protocol is fatally flawed, for two reasons: (1) the four unnecessary “public benefits” requirements inherently devalue the asset; and (2) you are prohibiting competitive bids. Both of these elements ensure that you will not be able to get the best possible offer for the transfer, which you are required to do as fiduciaries.

Any sale should be made through a straight up, no-string-attached auction of the property. That is the only way you can determine fair market value.

To illustrate how much money you are leaving on the table, we’ve done two sets of calculations. In one scenario, we took the difference between the “official” price tag of $220.8 million and the high appraisal of $262 million ($41.2 million), and calculated the value of that over 50 and 100 year periods.

In another scenario, we assumed that the Land Board took the “maximum revenue” approach by dispensing with appraisals and simply selling the Elliott via competitive bid with no public benefit requirements. For this scenario we picked $350 million as a conservative value for what the winning bid might be, then subtracted the official price of $220.8 and used the difference ($129.2 million) as the starting point.

We used two different assumptions about future return rates – the first being the 7.5% used by Oregon PERS, and the second a more conservative rate of 6.0%. The projections are below.

Elliott State Forest sale

Investment projections of net proceeds under various assumptions

Difference between high appraisal and sale price: $41.2 M
Interest rate 7.5% 7.5% 6.0% 6.0%
Time period 100 years 50 years 100 years 50 years
Present value $41,200,000 $41,200,000 $41,200,000 $41,200,000
Future value $56,982,781,049 $1,532,217,537 $13,979,245,841 $758,910,356
Difference between market price and sale price: $129.2M 7.5% 7.5% 6.0% 6.0%
Time period 100 years 50 years 100 years 50 years
Present value $129,200,000 $129,200,000 $129,200,000 $129,200,000
Future value $178,693,575,522 $4,804,915,187 $43,837,829,190 $2,379,883,932

Notice the stunning difference in earnings between the first 50 years and the second 50 years. This is, of course, the miracle of compounding. The refusal of the Land Board to sell off this land in a traditional auction will likely cost public school students somewhere between $44 billion and $179 billion in lost earnings by 2117, and much more in the centuries beyond that. 

You have a fiduciary responsibility to the CSF beneficiaries to get the best possible price for the timberland. That can only come through a traditional auction. I urge you to set aside the one offer in front of you and direct the DSL staff to design a new, competitive bid sale protocol to be implemented during 2017.

Sincerely,

John A. Charles, Jr.

President & CEO

Cascade Policy Institute

How Much Is the Elliott State Forest Worth to Oregon Schools? (Don’t Forget the Value of Compounding)

By John A. Charles, Jr.

Advocates of public schools frequently complain about the need for more money, yet many of them are now objecting that the State Land Board is on the verge of selling off the Elliott State Forest, which is an endowment asset for public schools.

The fact is, the Land Board is required by the Oregon Constitution to maximize revenue from the Elliott. The sale has to go forward because timber management is no longer profitable. But the Board should insist on competitive bids, which it is currently prohibiting. The Board should also remove all restrictions on future timber harvesting.

If the Elliott were sold in a competitive auction, it would likely go for $350 million or more. Let’s assume that the proceeds were invested in a manner similar to the PERS fund and had average annual returns of 7.5%, which is the target rate for PERS.

After 50 years, the investment would be worth $13 billion; but after 100 years, it would be worth $487 billion. The huge difference in the two time periods is due to the miracle of compounding.

Do school funding advocates have a better idea for raising $487 billion? If not, they should support an auction sale of the Elliott State Forest.


John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

New Report Highlights Civil Rights Implications of Oregon Land Use Laws, Urban Growth Boundaries

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Media Contact:
John A. Charles, Jr.

john@cascadepolicy.org

503-242-0900

PORTLAND, Ore. – A new report released today by Cascade Policy Institute demonstrates that Portland’s rapidly growing housing prices are a major hardship on newcomers, renters, and low-income families. The report claims the ultimate source of Portland’s crisis in housing affordability is the region’s urban growth boundary and that minorities suffer the most from the consequences of high housing prices.

The report, Using Disparate Impact to Restore Housing Affordability and Property Rights, is authored by Randal O’Toole, an adjunct scholar with Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization, and the author of The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths.

The report claims the ultimate source of Portland’s crisis in housing affordability is the region’s urban growth boundary:

“The Oregon legislature and various cities have applied band-aid solutions to this problem; but none of them will work and some, such as inclusionary zoning, will actually make housing less affordable. That is because none of these solutions address the real problem, which is that the urban growth boundaries and other land-use restrictions imposed by the Land Conservation and Development Commission, Metro, and city and county governments have made it impossible for builders to keep up with the demand for new housing.”

“Common sense says that restricting the supply of something for which demand is increasing will cause prices to go up,” says O’Toole, who cites the findings of economic studies from Harvard, the Federal Reserve Board, the University of California, and the University of Washington, among others, to conclude that strict land-use regulation is the main cause of unaffordable housing.

Other policies which make Portland-area housing less affordable, the report claims, include lengthy delays in the permitting process, onerous impact fees, and architectural design codes. But these policies would have little effect if developers could meet market demand by building homes in unregulated areas outside of existing cities. Urban growth boundaries not only limit supply, but they shield city governments from outside competition.

“These policies effectively discriminate against low-income blacks and other minorities,” says O’Toole. “Under the 2015 Supreme Court ruling, Texas Department of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, they also violate the Fair Housing Act just as much as if Portland put out a sign saying, ‘No blacks allowed.’”

O’Toole explains how this Court decision could have a profound impact on Portland’s housing market. He says the Supreme Court’s ruling said that land use policies that make housing more expensive can be legal under the Fair Housing Act only if they have a legitimate goal and there is no other way of accomplishing that goal without making housing less affordable.

According to Cascade Policy Institute CEO John A. Charles, Jr., “Policymakers think the solution to our housing shortage is to build more tax-subsidized apartments, but simply deregulating the land markets would result in far greater housing supply at lower cost.”

The report, Using Disparate Impact to Restore Housing Affordability and Property Rights, is available here.

Founded in 1991, Cascade Policy Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy research and educational organization that focuses on state and local issues in Oregon. Cascade’s mission is to develop and promote public policy alternatives that foster individual liberty, personal responsibility, and economic opportunity. For more information, visit cascadepolicy.org.

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Not One Dollar More

The State of Oregon will sell 84,000 acres of the Elliott State Forest by March 2017, in order to make money for public schools.

However, the lands will not be auctioned to the highest bidder. In fact, they will not be auctioned at all. The State will set the price based on appraisals, and purchasers will pay that price.

If there is more than one offer, the tie will be broken based on which buyer promises the most “public benefits.” Those benefits are defined as public access to at least 50% of the property; preservation of old growth timber; protection of stream corridors; and the guarantee of at least 40 jobs for 10 years.

Evaluating competing offers promising “more jobs” versus “wider stream corridors” will be entirely subjective—in essence, a beauty contest. At a meeting last week for prospective buyers, the Department of State Lands was asked about the possibility of simply offering a higher bid. They responded that if someone bid even one dollar over the appraised value, it would be deemed a “non-responsive” offer and rejected.

Prospective buyers were stunned. The timber is likely to be worth somewhere between $300 million and $450 million, and a high bid could really help schools. But for the State Land Board, price doesn’t matter.


John A. Charles, Jr. is President and CEO of Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market public policy research organization.

When Will the State Land Board Restore the “Trust” in Oregon’s State Trust Lands?

 

By Anna Mae Kersey

When Oregon joined the Union in 1859, it was granted approximately 3.4 million acres by Congress in State Trust Lands, public lands managed by the state to support public education. In so doing, Congress assigned a fiduciary responsibility to the state to produce a profit from these lands for the Common School Fund in perpetuity. Over time, Oregon sold the majority of these lands in an effort to yield more economic benefits for the fund, with some 772,776 acres remaining under state management.

 

Unfortunately, those lands have been poorly managed, especially when compared with other Western states and the federal government.


 

Average Annual Return on Investment

State Trust Lands vs. Federal Management

2009-2013

Jurisdiction Revenues Expenditures Returns per dollar spent
 
New Mexico $554,218,262 $13,516,608 $41.00
Arizona $231,823,603 $16,629,652 $13.94
Montana $107,610,838 $12,443,132 $8.65
Bureau of Land Mgmt. $4,690,082,024 $1,508,484,072 $3.11
Idaho $66,033,347 $23,572,154 $2.80
Oregon (2013-14) $8,096,821 $7,593,305 $1.09
U.S. Forest Service $571,781,109 $5,708,126,237 $0.10

 

 

 


 

When Oregon can barely break even on lands that other states manage for great profit, it is a serious indictment of leadership by the State Land Board.

Furthermore, only 7,400 acres of the 772,776 acres currently classified as State Trust Lands actually meet the criteria of having either short- or long-term revenue earning potential. This means that approximately 96 percent of State Trust Lands show no signs of generating revenue in five to ten years.

The primary reason for the discrepancy between Oregon’s profit margins and those of its peer states is the endangered species restrictions placed on the Elliott State Forest. These restrictions have transformed these lands from profit producing assets into deficit inducing liabilities.

Oregon, in essence, is in default to the Common School Fund. In addition to its obligation to continue to bring in revenue, it is also legally bound to maintain “intergenerational equity” and “cannot benefit current students at the disadvantage of future students, or vice versa.” Neither current nor future students stand to benefit from a deficit.

In contrast, the Common School Fund itself earns significant net revenue for schools each year. Assets of the Fund are invested by the State Treasurer and the Oregon Investment Council and consistently exceed performance expectations, earning an annual average of 13.25 percent return on investment over the past three years, as opposed to the 0.1 percent return on investment by the State Trust Lands.

There can be no public trust in an agreement where one side, time and time again, fails to deliver. On August 13, the State Land Board will meet in Salem to discuss the Elliott State Forest. It is imperative that board members look to the past to prepare for the future. There is already a precedent of transferring lands to private ownership. The board needs to sell those lands that are costing the fund and future generations, so that the trust in State Trust Lands can be restored.

Anna Mae Kersey is a research associate at Cascade Policy Institute, Oregon’s free market think tank. She recently graduated from Mercer University in Macon, Georgia with an Honors B.A. in Philosophy and is pursuing a Master’s of Liberal Arts at St. John’s College in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

 

 

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